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In October 1998 war clouds were gathering over the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey, in the middle of a gruelling campaign against the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in its eastern 
territories, accused Syria of supporting the Kurdish rebels, not least by hosting PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan in Damascus. This was the latest incident in a long history of uneasy relations 
between two neighbours who have held a catalogue of territorial, ideological, political and 
resource-related grievances that remained unsettled since each state’s creation. Indeed, in fi fty 
years of independence, no Syrian head of state had ever visited the Turkish capital, Ankara. 
Now, with the dispatch of 10,000 Turkish troops to the border and Turkish President Suleyman 
Demeriel’s declaration that Hafez al-Assad, his Syrian counterpart, must face consequences for 
his support of the PKK, escalation to confl ict appeared inevitable. Yet rather than falling into 
the abyss, Assad relented. Ocalan was expelled, Syrian support for the PKK ended, and Turkey 
and Syria quickly signed the Adana accords on 20th October, which marked the beginning of an 
unexpected new chapter in the previously antagonistic relations between the two neighbours.
A decade later, any thought of confl ict is far removed. In September 2009, Turkey’s foreign minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu and his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Mouallim signed an accord that ended visa-
requirements between the two states. This, along with an earlier agreement to allow free trade, 
ensured that people and goods could pass freely over the same borders that had been peppered 
with barbed wire and landmines barely eleven years earlier. In what marks a signifi cant turnaround in 
relations Damascus and Ankara have found themselves increasingly closely integrated over the past 
decade. In what has become a close personal relationship, Syria’s president, Hafez’s son Bashar al-
Assad, now describes Turkey as Syria’s best friend, while Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, 
publicly calls Syrians his brothers. Even though, at the time of writing, President Assad was facing 
international condemnation for a harsh crackdown on pro-democracy activists at home, Erdogan 
remained restrained in his criticism of the Syrian leader, urging restraint and reform but cautioning 
against too harsh a global response – quite the transformation from the warmongering of 1998.
Why did this turnaround come about? Turkey’s recent reengagement with the Arab states such as 
Syria, after years of estrangement, has divided analysts. Some see ideology as the main driver, with 
the Islamic origins of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) pushing Turkey closer to Muslim 
states at the expense of historical ties with Europe, the US and Israel. Others see pragmatic realism in 
Turkey’s approach. Davutoglu, who was a Professor of International Relations before turning to politics, 
advocates a doctrine of ‘zero problems’ and ‘strategic depth’ with all of Turkey’s neighbours, to further 
Ankara’s regional clout and to boost its rapidly expanding economy. On the Syrian side, most see a 
pragmatic dimension to Damascus’ friendship with Ankara, providing Bashar al-Assad and his Ba’ath 
regime with a vital ally during a diffi cult decade of US-led international isolation. Nonetheless, ideology 
is not totally absent from Syria’s thinking, as the Turkish alliance has allowed Damascus to boost its 
regional profi le and aid its weak economy without abandoning its long-standing confrontation with 
Israel and western ‘imperialism’. In considering what has driven the relationship in the past decade, this 
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article suggests that though realism has propelled 
both sides, no major ideological compromise have 
been required. 
HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES
Recent closeness contrasts with Syria and Turkey’s 
historical enmity. The creation of each state was 
in some ways defi ned in opposition to the other. 
The Republic of Turkey founded by Ataturk out of 
the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 was 
culturally and politically orientated towards Europe 
rather than its former territory, with Arabic script 
rejected for Latin and Arabic words removed from the 
Turkish language. Adamant followers of Attaturk, 
the Kemalists, carried this European approach into 
their foreign policy for years. Syria also defi ned 
itself against Turkey on gaining independence from 
France in 1946. As the self-declared ‘heart’ of Arab 
nationalism, Damascus projected the Ottoman 
Turks as its repressive historical enemy. The French 
exacerbated this rivalry in 1938 by giving Turkey 
the Syrian province of Alexandretta (Hatay) in a bid 
to maintain Turkish neutrality in the Second World 
War. The loss of Hatay fi rst prompted Syrian calls 
for a ‘resurrection’ or ‘Ba’ath’ of Arab nationalism, 
eventually merging into the party that has ruled 
Syria since 1963. Ever since, the regime maintained 
its grievances with Ankara, laying claim to Hatay 
and including it on offi cial Syrian maps. From the 
1960s water also became a recurrent source of 
disagreement, with tensions heightening in the 
1990s when Damascus complained that Turkish 
plans to dam large sections of the Euphrates would 
cripple its agricultural sector. 
Turkey and Syria also found themselves on opposite 
sides of the Cold War. Turkey was a member of 
NATO while Syria received the most Soviet military 
aid in the Middle East. Syria, determined to regain 
the Golan Heights from Israel that it lost in the 
1967 war, backed a motley collection of Palestinian 
and Lebanese militant groups to harass Tel Aviv and 
derail American visions for the region. Turkey, in 
contrast, formed close military and economic ties 
with the US and, latterly, Israel. By 1979, these 
long-standing grievances persuaded Hafez, Syrian 
president from 1970-2000, to support Turkey’s 
enemy, the PKK, providing them with training camps 
fi rst in Lebanon and later in Syria itself. Though 
this was partially motivated by domestic concerns, 
as support for the PKK also helped placate Syria’s 
own Kurdish population, support for the Kurdish 
rebels appeared mainly functional: a bargaining 
chip for water and Hatay. Hafez’s willingness to 
jettison all support for the PKK in 1998 after the 
Adana accords, illustrates the pragmatic nature 
of Assad’s alliance with Ocalan. Support for the 
PKK had failed to improve Damascus’ hand on its 
historical grievances, yet had pushed Turkey closer 
to its greater enemy, Israel, with whom Ankara 
signed a military accord in 1996, and now brought 
a genuine threat of Turkish military intervention. In 
essence, Turkey upped the stakes and Syria quickly 
folded.
SHIFTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Yet avoiding war in 1998 did not necessarily lead 
to closer alignment. It was the shifting domestic 
and international circumstances for both regimes 
that developed a diplomatic rapprochement into 
the integrated alliance it later became. For Turkey, 
though relations with Syria did improve under the 
Kemalist foreign minister, Ismail Cem (1997-2002), 
the election of the AKP in 2002 catalysed the 
enhanced ties. This was not, however, due to any 
ideological familiarity between the Islamist-leaning 
AKP and its fellow Muslim state in Syria. The AKP 
was equally eager to push Turkey’s application to 
the EU and improve relations with long-standing 
rivals Greece, irrespective of religion. Instead 
the enhanced ties with Damascus refl ected the 
new pragmatic foreign policy of AKP ideologue 
Davotoglu. Moreover, Syria did not have a blank 
cheque, and ties strained on occasion, notably 
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when Turkey joined the international chorus 
for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon after the 
assassaintaion of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafi k 
Hariri in 2005. Additionally, the new approach had 
a strong economic component. After the fi nancial 
meltdown of 2001, Turkey recovered well in the 
2000s and sought new markets for its booming 
economy, and the relatively stable Syria proved an 
obvious target. 
Changing international circumstances also pushed 
Turkey closer to Syria. The Iraq war forced Ankara 
to reconsider its approach to the Middle East. The 
removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 left a vacuum 
in Iraq that was rapidly fi lled by Islamists, sectarian 
fi ghting and Kurdish nationalists, posing a threat 
to Turkey on its previously quiet southern border. 
Erdogan recognised the need to be more active 
in the new Iraq and the south in general. Backing 
certain Iraqi political parties and improved relations 
with Iran were a key facet of this strategy, but Syria 
quickly emerged as a key ally in the new strategy. 
The autonomy of Iraq’s Kurds post-2003 was one 
concern, with Ankara fearing it would revive the 
PKK. In 2007 Erdogan launched an invasion of Iraqi 
territory to destroy newly built PKK bases. Almost 
immediately, Assad rushed to support the action. 
Syria, who had quashed its own Kurds emboldened 
by the freedom they saw in Iraq in 2004, provided 
Turkish intervention with international support. 
More broadly, the Iraq war also presented Turkey 
with new realities in the Middle East. Its Cold War 
ally, the US, had rushed into a regional confl ict that 
Ankara opposed, denying Washington the right to 
use its territory to attack northern Iraq. Similarly, 
soon after the fall of Baghdad, George W. Bush’s 
administration ramped up its rhetoric against Iran 
and Syria, alienating Turkey’s neighbours, enraging 
their domestic populations and many within Turkey 
too. Turkey began to recognise that if the US vision 
for the Middle East was no longer in line with 
its own, Ankara might have to assert itself more 
prominently to the south, and Syria proved crucial 
in doing this.
Changing international and domestic factors 
overlap to explain Syria’s new approach to Turkey 
as well, though issues of regime survival rather than 
ideology were paramount. On assuming power 
after his father’s death in 2000, Bashar al-Assad 
took several years to consolidate his own power. It 
was not until the Lebanon crisis of 2005, brought 
about by alleged Syrian involvement in the Hariri 
assassination, that Bashar was forced to assert his 
own authority. Under Hafez, Syria’s foreign policy 
became a pillar of domestic legitimacy, projecting 
power in Lebanon, defying Israel and, theoretically, 
supporting the Palestinians. The Lebanon crisis, in 
which Syria was humiliatingly forced to withdraw its 
troops from its western neighbour, made Damascus 
look weak and threatened Bashar’s domestic 
legitimacy. Former vice-president Khaddam 
used the crisis to justify his cooperation with the 
opposition Muslim Brotherhood in exile and call for 
Bashar’s government to be overthrown. 
More signifi cant than the domestic threat, which 
lacked both popular support and suffi cient 
elite backing, was the danger posed by the 
Bush administration. Having been forced out of 
Lebanon, Syria appeared vulnerable. A vocal lobby 
in Congress called for Damascus to be the next 
regime changed after Baghdad, and Israel was 
emboldened to bomb a suspected nuclear facility 
deep in Syrian territory in 2007 and, allegedly, 
was behind two assassinations on Syrian territory 
in 2008. The US initiated a diplomatic boycott on 
Syria after Hariri’s killing, which was acceded to by 
most of its allies, including the EU and the Arab 
world. Facing isolation and needing foreign support 
to bolster his position at home, Bashar cast his net 
for new allies. While this drew him closer to old ally 
Iran and rising regional player Qatar, it was Turkey 
that he courted most – making the historic fi rst trip 
by a Syrian president to Ankara in 2004. Assad was 
willing to make substantial sacrifi ces to forge this 
new friendship, such as fi nally accepting Turkish 
sovereignty over Hatay in 2005. He also proved 
a shrewd diplomat, rushing to support Turkey’s 
2007 incursion in Iraq to show his loyalty to his 
36
new friend. Bashar’s labours were rewarded when 
Turkish president Sezar defi ed US protestations 
and went through with a proposed state visit to 
Damascus in March 2005, at the height of the 
Lebanese crisis. This set the tone for the coming 
blossoming of the relationship, and Turkey made 
a point of internationally rehabilitating its new 
ally. Not surprisingly, when the French president, 
Nicholas Sarkozy, eventually broke the international 
boycott and visited Syria in 2007, Assad met him 
accompanied with Erdogan stood by his side.
THE RELATIONSHIP TODAY
After evolving from a diplomatic rapprochement 
into a fully formed alliance, the Syria-Turkey 
relationship today is composed of several key 
strands: diplomatic, economic, military and cultural. 
The diplomatic side is of the greatest value to 
Syria, as Bashar al-Assad has made it a key pillar 
of his foreign policy. Turkey’s role in easing Syria 
back into the international fold was crucial, and 
not just in defying the US diplomatic boycott. 
As important was Turkey’s efforts in meditating 
indirect peace talks between Syria and Israel in 
2007-8 that, though they came to nothing, helped 
soften Syria’s image. This certainly helped the EU to 
justify ending the ineffective diplomatic boycott of 
Damascus in 2008, eventually even offering Syria 
membership of the Euro-Med partnership. It also 
allowed American opponents to George Bush, such 
as Nancy Pelosi who visited Damascus in 2007, 
to engage with Syria, and that engagement in 
turn helped the new US administration of Barack 
Obama end the boycott altogether, though some 
Bush-era sanctions remained. Moreover, as Turkey’s 
relationship with Israel has declined in recent years, 
most notably over the IDF’s assault on a Turkish 
aid fl otilla to Gaza in May 2010, Erdogan has won 
much praise on the Arab street. Though Assad 
said he wanted Turkey to maintain strong ties with 
Israel, hoping for an eventual return to mediation, 
he also benefi tted domestically from association 
with the popular Erdogan. Pictures were distributed 
of Assad’s many meetings with Erdogan after the 
Gaza fl otilla in 2010. The domestic benefi t of 
the alliance for Syria has the added bonus that 
Turkey, as a mainly Sunni country, is more popular 
with the mainly Sunni Syrian population than its 
longstanding alliance with Shia Iran.
Turkey also benefi ts diplomatically from its ties to 
Syria, beyond the simple pragmatism of getting 
on better with a neighbour. Syria has acted as 
a gateway to the Arab world for Turkey both 
economically and politically. Prior to the 2000s it 
was not only the Syrians who had a negative opinion 
of the Turks, with the foundation-myths of Jordan 
and Iraq all containing a considerable anti-Ottoman 
element. Befriending the Arab nationalist regime 
in Damascus thus helped soften Turkey’s own 
regional image, even before Erdogan started taking 
a more populist line on Israel. Backing pro-Palestine 
Syria also plays well domestically with the AKP’s 
conservative base at home. An improved image has 
certainly helped Turkey boost its regional clout, and 
strengthen its economic ties with the region, with 
trade from the Arab world now representing 10% 
of Turkey’s overall trade. 
The Syrian-Turkish relationship also has a vital 
economic component, a reminder that much of 
Davutoglu’s ‘zero problems’ strategy is about 
fi nding new markets for Turkey’s booming 
economy. A year after the Adana accords, the fi rst 
economic missions were dispatched to Ankara 
and Damascus. A Joint Economic Committee was 
established that facilitated trade agreements and 
sponsored events such as the industrial exhibition 
in Damascus in January 2004 where 300 Turkish 
manufacturers returned home with $250 million 
worth of Syrian contracts. By January 2007 a 
bilateral free trade agreement had come into 
force and in 2009 visa free movement of people 
was agreed. As the senior, and richer, partner, 
Turkey has invested a considerable amount on 
infrastructural projects in Syria, particularly around 
the northern city of Aleppo. In 2008 Ankara 
committed $6.3 million to 42 cooperative projects 
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as part of the new Syrian-Turkish Inter-Regional 
Cooperation Programme and in 2011 started 
work on a ‘friendship dam’ on the Orontes river 
in Hatay that would irrigate Turkish and Syrian 
land. Syria certainly benefi ts from Turkish trade 
and investment. Syria’s exports to Turkey rose 
from $187m in 2006 to $662m in 2010. Turkish 
companies have built much-needed infrastructure, 
such as cement plants and hotels, and boosted the 
oil and tourism industry. Yet there are downsides 
as superior Turkish manufactured goods threaten 
previously protected Syrian businesses. Within two 
years of the free trade agreement, one of Aleppo’s 
oldest textile manufacturers, the Kouefati Group, 
had gone bankrupt after failing to compete. No 
such problems exist for Turkish businesses that are 
thriving in the new market. Turkish exports saw a 
3-fold increase between 2006 and 2010, rising to 
a value of $1.85bn, making Syria Turkey’s seventh-
largest market in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Though Syria may treasure the investment, 
its trade defi cit with Ankara is growing, making 
the economic relationship increasingly one sided. 
Military cooperation between Syria and Turkey 
is limited, but symbolic. After years of Turkish 
military cooperation with Israel, the conduct of a 
joint Turkish-Syrian military exercise in April 2009 
served as a psychological boost to Damascus over 
its southern enemy. For Turkey, who sent military 
delegations to Syria and conducted joint training, 
the arrangement is mainly aimed at securing its 
southern border, and Turkey is unlikely to risk the 
United States’ wrath by forging a serious military 
partnership. The dilapidated Syrian military still 
relies on Russia and Iran for hardware, while 
Turkey retains military contracts with Israel, despite 
their frosty diplomatic relationship. In terms of 
natural resources, the alliance has fi nally eased 
long-standing water concerns. As of 2008, Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq agreed to hold regular summits to 
discuss the allocation of water from the Euphrates 
and Tigris, defusing previous tension. In another 
symbolic gesture, Erdogan agreed to divert 
Euphrates water into the long dried up Quweiq 
River that runs through Aleppo, providing a boost 
to its fl agging agriculture and a showpiece for the 
city centre. 
An overlooked but key area of cooperation is 
the cultural sphere. In recent years Turkey has 
furthered its soft power throughout the Arab 
world by promoting cultural products such as 
popular television dramas that have gripped Arab 
households. Syrian production companies have 
dubbed the dramas into the Syria Arabic dialect for 
export to Gulf-funded Arab satellite channels. One 
drama in particular, Nour, had an unprecedented 
impact. During Ramadan Arab streets were 
deserted when this Turkish drama was shown, 
accruing viewing fi gures in the tens of millions. The 
serials, which broadcast modern Turkish life into 
Arab living rooms, help to improve the regional 
image of a prosperous fellow Muslim country. Until 
recently Arab serials, often originating in Syria that 
has a reputation for strong Arab dramas and good 
actors would portray Turks as the enemy in historical 
stories about Ottoman oppression. Now Syria, by 
providing the dubbing, proves the key gateway for 
Turkey into the wider Arab cultural sphere. Syria 
has had less of a cultural impact on Turkey, which 
perhaps is expected given their differences in size 
and cultural reach. That said, Turkish tourism into 
Syria has boomed and, it is said, closer relations 
with Syria have helped Turkey reassess and even 
embrace the Ottoman past it had until recently 
shunned.
FRIENDS FOREVER?
The revolution in Turkish-Syrian relations in the 
past decades, from enmity to close friendship, has 
essentially been driven by pragmatism on both 
sides. For Syria, facing diplomatic isolation and a 
fl ailing economy, improving ties with Ankara was 
a no-brainer. For Turkey, the election of the realist 
AKP and new regional realities created by the US’ 
invasion of Iraq prompted a push for increased 
regional infl uence, and Syria, with its long southern 
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border, was an obvious starting point. Yet crucially 
for both sides, détente and then alliance did not 
come at a great ideological cost. Syria had to 
give up its support of the PKK and accept the 
permanent loss of Hatay, but neither had been 
an ideological pillar of the Ba’ath regime that was 
not worth sacrifi cing to stabilise the embattled 
order. Moreover, the support of Turkey in the face 
of diplomatic isolation allowed Syria to avoid any 
unpopular compromise in the confl ict with Israel, 
the regime’s principle ideological focus. For Turkey, 
resolving its differences with Syria did require a 
shift in the rigid anti-Arab ideological approach of 
generations of Kemalists. However the change in 
foreign policy, from a solely Euro-centric foreign 
policy to Davutoglu’s wider ‘zero problems’ 
strategy, was motivated by realism and economics, 
not any pro-Islamic stance of the AKP as some have 
alleged. Syria’s principle value was its geographical 
closeness and economic underdevelopment, not a 
similar religion or ideology.
The relationship with Syria has given Turkey a 
gateway into the Arab world diplomatically, 
economically and culturally and Ankara’s 
involvement in Middle Eastern affairs has now 
become normalised. The fact that after the wave 
of popular unrest in the Arab world in early 2011 
many activists are looking to Turkey’s AKP as a 
model of how Islamic pluralist democracy can work, 
illustrates how far Turkey’s regional soft power has 
reached. As the Arab world begins to democratise, 
Turkey is well placed to benefi t from new alliances 
as a model to emulate. Yet at the same time, 
that might be at the cost of its relationship with 
Syria, which is threatened by the wave of anti-
authoritarian feeling. Having focused so much on 
foreign policy and breaking the diplomatic boycott 
with Turkey’s help, domestic concerns have been 
neglected and Bashar Assad’s regime was shocked 
when unrest erupted in Syria in March 2011. At the 
time of writing the Ba’athists were engaged in a 
brutal crackdown on pro-democracy activists, with 
over 1000 deaths reported. Though Erdogan has 
been cautious to criticise, despite a new wave of 
European and US sanctions on regime members, if 
the regime survives it is unlikely that he will be able 
to publically be as close to Assad as before. Indeed, 
given the Turkish commercial interests in Syria, 
Erdogan may begin to wonder if regime change is 
more to Turkey’s liking, especially if domestic Turkish 
public opinion turns on Assad and international 
pressure falls on Turkish companies to divest. 
Yet even if Assad survives this newest round of 
isolation, there is no guarantee that Turkey, for all 
its previous friendship, would ride to the rescue 
a second time. This in many ways typifi es the 
inherent imbalance in the relationship: that Assad 
needs Erdogan far more than Erdogan needs Assad. 
While Syria relies on Turkey economically and 
diplomatically, Turkey’s use for Syria has diminished. 
Ankara now has much larger potential markets in 
Iraq, Egypt and the Gulf and it will continue to 
infl uence the Arab world even if Syria were to pull 
itself out of the alliance. Moreover, were Assad to 
fall, Erdogan recognises that such is the dependence 
of Syria on Turkey as a consequence of the past 
decade of cooperation, any new regime would 
prove just as compliant as the current Ba’athists. ■
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